114 LESSONS FROM NATURE. [CHAP. V. 



trifling, though fixed, rule of etiquette&quot; (vol. i. p. 92). This 

 is most true ; some trifling breach of good manners may 

 indeed occasion us pain ; but this may be unaccompanied by 

 a judgment that we are morally blameworthy. It is judgment, 

 and not feeling, which has to do with right and wrong. But 

 a yet better example might be given. What quality can 

 have been more universally useful to social communities than 

 courage? It has always been, and is still, greatly admired 

 and highly appreciated, and is especially adapted, both 

 directly and indirectly, to enable its possessors to become the 

 fathers of succeeding generations. If the social instinct were 

 the basis of the moral sense, it is infallibly certain that 

 courage must have come to be regarded as supremely &quot; good,&quot; 

 and cowardice to be deserving of the deepest moral condem 

 nation. And yet what is the fact ? A coward feels probably 

 self-contempt and that he has incurred the contempt of his 

 associates, but he does not feel &quot; wicked.&quot; He is painMly 

 conscious of his defective organisation, but he knows that an 

 organisation, however defective, cannot in itself constitute 

 moral demerit. Similarly, we, the observers, despise, avoid, 

 or hate a coward; but we can clearly understand that a 

 coward may be a more virtuous man than another who 

 abounds in animal courage. 



The better still to show how completely distinct are the 

 conceptions &quot;enduring or strong instincts&quot; and &quot;virtuous 

 desires&quot; on the one hand, and &quot;transient or weak impulses&quot; 

 and &quot; vicious inclinations &quot; on the other, let us substitute in 

 the following passage for the words which Mr. Darwin, on 

 his own principles, illegitimately introduces, others which 

 accord with those principles, and we shall see how such 

 substitution eliminates every element of morality from the 

 passage : 



&quot; Looking to future generations, there is no cause to fear 

 that the social instincts will grow weaker, and we may expect 

 that enduring [virtuous] habits will grow stronger, becoming 

 perhaps fixed by inheritance. In this case the struggle be 

 tween our stronger [higher] and weaker [lower] impulses will 



