CHAP. V.] DUTY AND PLEASURE. 121 



tion which the object (whether external or internal) has for the eye. 

 Hence, when we fix our attention on a particular object by a deter 

 minate act of our own, the strength of the effort required to do so is 

 greater in proportion to the attraction of some other object. Thus, the 

 student who is earnestly endeavouring to comprehend a passage in 

 Prometheus/ or to solve a mathematical problem, may have his atten 

 tion grievously distracted by the sound of a neighbouring piano, which 

 will make him think of the fair one who is playing it, or of the beloved 

 object with whom he last waltzed to the same measure. Here the will 

 may do its very utmost to keep the attention fixed, and may yet be 

 overmastered by an involuntary attraction too potent for it ; just as if 

 a powerful electro-magnet were to snatch from our hands a piece of 

 iron which we do our very utmost to retain within our grasp.&quot; Mental 

 Physiology, p. 132. 



Closely connected with this fact of active &quot;attention&quot; 

 is the faculty of choice and volition of which we are all 

 conscious. Just as our consciousness tells us that we are 

 continuously existing beings, so our consciousness tells us 

 that we have a power of choice which we occasionally exercise 

 in opposition to what most strongly attracts us. We are 

 conscious of volitions of two distinct kinds (1.) An act of 

 will in which we simply follow, without deliberation, in the 

 direction induced by all the attractions and repulsions act 

 ing upon us as when we walk down to dinner, or stretch out 

 our hand to save a person from falling. (2.) An act of will 

 in which, after full deliberation, we elect to follow a course 

 which we perceive to be in opposition to the resultant impulse 

 of all the involuntary attractions and repulsions acting upon 

 us, and make an &quot; anti-impulsive effort,&quot; * as when, from a 

 love of God, we deny ourselves an immediate gratification 

 from indulgence in which we do not perceive any remote 

 evil consequences to ourselves. It is not necessary on this 

 occasion to go further into the question of free-will ; it is 

 sufficient for our present purpose to note, as an unquestion 

 able fact, that men believe they have this double kind of 

 volition, and that they have a firm persuasion of their power 



* Upon this subject &ee the article on Mr. Mill s denial of Free-will in the 

 April number of the Dublin Review, and an appendix to that article in the 

 number for July 1874. 



