CHAP. V.] DUTY AND PLEASUKE. 123 



which our self-consciousness assures us we have of apprehend 

 ing moral worth, which we have already considered, but as to 

 which a few final words may be added. On introspection, it 

 is at once apparent that in pronouncing any man or action to 

 be &quot; good &quot; our reason forms a judgment different in kind 

 from the judgment that any man or action is &quot;pleasure- 

 giving.&quot; If our neighbour, intending to do us a malicious in 

 jury, through some miscalculation on his part, benefits us, we 

 do not on that account judge him in so acting to have acted 

 &quot; rightly,&quot; or pronounce his action to have been &quot; virtuoiis.&quot; 

 Indeed, so far from our necessarily associating &quot; pleasure &quot; 

 with virtue, we judge a benevolent action to have had its 

 merit increased by the very self-denial which may have in 

 evitably resulted from its performance. We are able clearly 

 enough to distinguish between a deliberate judgment that 

 any given action of ours is right or wrong, and a spontaneous 

 indeliberate tendency to do what is generally approved of by 

 those with whom we dwell or a feeling of distress at some 

 violation of conventionality. The failure to repress, when in 

 society, some harmless natural function may produce the 

 most acute feeling of distress without the smallest perception 

 that any &quot;wrong&quot; has been committed; and on the other 

 hand we may have given pleasure to and received the most 

 lively proofs of gratitude from our fellows on account of 

 some act which has been really done against our conscience. 

 Far from our perception of morality being the same thing 

 with a feeling of deference to the opinions and feelings of 

 our fellow-men, we ourselves judge whether society in certain 

 cases is right or wrong, and we demand a rational basis and 

 justification for social claims themselves. 



The name of Mr. Herbert Spencer has been above referred 

 to in connection with this matter, and the position ^ r en ^ e e r r ^ ert 

 he takes up must not be passed over. In the first W8 . 

 place the process of evolution, as understood by Mr. Spencer, 

 compels him to be at one with Mr. Darwin in his denial of 

 the existence of any fundamental and essential distinction 

 between duty and pleasure. Virtuous lives are represented as 



