CHAP. V.] DUTY AND PLEASUEE. 127 



fact that Mr. Spencer himself, when he published his theory, 

 was himself unaware that it might &quot; be so regarded.&quot; 



To sum up then, it is unquestionable, if what has been 

 here urged is valid, that nothing put forward by 

 Mr. Mill, Mr. Darwin, Mr. Huxley, or Mr. Spencer, 

 has any weight in contradicting that lesson which nature, by 

 introspection, teaches us namely, that we have a power of 

 discerning, and of freely obeying, an objective moral code 

 which our faculties are organised to discern ; a power of 

 forming more or less developed moral judgments being uni 

 versally diffused amongst mankind, while there is no evi 

 dence that any such judgments are formed by even the very 

 highest members of the mere brute creation. Moreover, it 

 is clear that to assert moral judgments to be but feelings of 

 social sympathy or love of tribe inherited and generally 

 misunderstood, is equivalent to a denial of morality root and 

 branch ; and, as we may hereafter come still more plainly to 

 see, absolutely stultifies moral precepts as being necessarily 

 mere folly. 



