CHAr. VII.] THE BEUTE. 193 



animals have been, however, and are very carefully 

 studied and observed, and it is generally assumed that to 

 understand &quot;Instinct&quot; the continued and reiterated study 

 of animal activity is the one thing necessary. It is obvious, 

 indeed, that without such study Instinct cannot be clearly 

 comprehended; and yet it may be questioned whether 

 mental activity, in its endeavour to understand Instinct, has 

 not been almost exclusively exercised in what, under existing 

 circumstances, is the least useful mode. Every object of 

 study is made clear to us by that which limits and contrasts 

 with it, just as the size of any particular building is brought 

 home to us by considering the size of surrounding objects, 

 or its relation to the human stature. To comprehend 

 Instinct is to appreciate justly its relations with the other 

 faculties of animals and with our own, and it is especially its 

 relation to Eeason which is an object of interest. It is, 

 then, plainly necessary that we should, more or less, perfectly 

 understand &quot;Eeason,&quot; in order to thoroughly understand 

 &quot; Instinct.&quot; Now, unfortunately, it appears that most of 

 those who have made it their business to study the The mode in 

 so-called &quot;minds&quot; of animals have taken very St lly 

 little pains to understand their own mind. If this appear 

 ance is not deceptive, it follows that what most requires to 

 be done, in order to justly appreciate &quot;Instinct,&quot; is to 

 patiently study, not Instinct, but Reason. Perhaps the most 

 remarkable circumstance connected with living English 

 writers, on questions such as those we here refer to, is the 

 conspicuous absence in them of any manifest comprehension 

 of those very powers they so continually exercise, and their 

 apparent want of appreciation of that Eeason to which they 

 verbally appeal. Thus, while what Instinct is, and can do, 

 is now fairly appreciated ; what it is not, and what it cannot 

 do, though Eeason can and does, is generally lost sight of 

 and ignored. 



That this defect should exist will not appear so surprising 

 when we consider how trying and difficult, for those unac 

 customed to it, is the habit of turning the mind in upon 







