194 LESSONS FEOM NATUEE. [CHAP. VII- 



itself, and the investigation by the mind of the mind s own pro- 

 Reason for cesses. It is not to be wondered at if many persons 

 this. gjjirk unw onted labour of this kind. Unfortunately, 



the study of Eeason, and therefore the study of Instinct also, 

 cannot be pursued with any reasonable hope of profit without 

 frequent use of this process of introspection, nor without 

 referring to, and at least briefly considering, some of the 

 most fundamental questions of Philosophy. This is, indeed, 

 obvious, since to compare &quot;Instinct&quot; with &quot;Eeason,&quot; we 

 must know what &quot; Reason &quot; is ; and this can only be ascer 

 tained by an inquiry into the activity of our own mind, into 

 its ultimate and supreme declarations, into the tests as to 

 such supremacy, and into the grounds on uhich we are, if at 

 all, to accept such supreme declarations as true. Yet, after 

 all, however arduous may be the process, it nevertheless does 

 come within the field of experimental science in its widest 

 sense. It does come within that field, because the elementary 

 truths concerning the mind and its modes of activity repose 

 upon observation and experiment, and the hypothesis which 

 the inductions so induced suggest can be verified by testing 

 experimentally such deductions as may necessarily flow 

 from such hypothesis. But the most important of these 

 observations are observations made by each observer on his 

 own mental processes, while many of the experiments are of 

 a similar nature. 



The slightest consideration of our own mental activity 



O 



soon shows us that, in addition to our various 



Results of in 

 trospection, feelings, we also &quot; think &quot; and &quot; will.&quot; Thus, when 



a kindness has been done us, besides pleasurable feelings 

 and emotions, we can think of and recognise the kindness of 

 the kind act possibly, also, the self-denying goodness 

 apparent in the performer of it and we can will to return 

 such kindness by some corresponding act on our own part. 

 On the other hand, we may feel great annoyance at some 

 hostile action ; and as we think of the unpleasant conse 

 quences, one after another, which will probably result to us 

 from it, and of the peculiar ingratitude and treachery of the 



