CHAP. VII.] THE BEUTE. 195 



doer, we may begin to determine upon some act of hostility 

 in return. The idea may then occur to us that revenge is 

 wrong, and we may wish to avoid our contemplated act of 

 hostility, but the &quot; malice &quot; of the action may have been 

 such, and our temperament may be so irascible, that the 

 temptation to revenge is almost overpowering. We may 

 then, with the deliberate intention of aiding the weakness of 

 our goodwill, deliberately consider all the claims on our 

 forbearance we can think of such, e.g., as that the father of 

 our enemy, while alive, did us many kindnesses ; that the 

 circumstances of his mother are such that any trouble or 

 anxiety would do her serious injury ; that the son has almost 

 ceased to be a rational man from his habitual intemperance ; 

 and we may reinforce these considerations by others drawn 

 from religion. Finally, we may force ourselves to relinquish 

 all hostile intention, and perhaps even to perform some 

 beneficial action instead. Here we have feelings and emo 

 tions; but, in addition, we have &quot;thought&quot; reflecting on 

 such feelings and emotions, and will&quot; dictating our re 

 sponsive action. These phenomena of our mind are facts of 

 observation and experience, as immediately perceptible as 

 any concerning our botly. 



On turning our mind inwards upon itself, we recognise 

 our own enduring existence as a fact supremely certain. 

 We know with absolute certainty that we are the same 

 person we were an hour ago, a week ago, perhaps many 

 years ago. If we are asked how we recognise our own 

 existence, we reply we recognise it by our activity, by the 

 actual exercise of our various powers in this instance by the 

 act of thinking, and thinking of ourselves. If we are further 

 asked whether we can prove our own existence to ourselves, we 

 reply that primary truths cannot be proved. Every process of 

 truth, as we have already seen, must ultimately rest on truths 

 directly known without proof, otherwise the process of reason 

 ing must run back for ever, and nothing could ever be proved. 

 Our own existence, as a primary truth directly known to 

 each of us, cannot be proved. Nevertheless, though we 



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