196 LESSONS FKOM NATURE. [CHAP. VII. 



cannot prove our own existence, we can bring forward a truth 

 to justify and reinforce our consciousness namely, &quot; What 

 ever thinks, exists ;&quot; and since we know that we can and do 

 think, it necessarily follows that we exist, and so reason 

 reinforces the declaration of consciousness. Should any one 

 object &quot;How do you know that such primary dicta are 

 true ? May not what you think is your existence be really 

 the existence of somebody else, or your life the dream of 

 some other being ?&quot; We reply, that in self-consciousness, 

 and in the perception of such primary truths as that &quot; What 

 thinks, exists,&quot; we reach the limit which nature has placed, 

 and that should any man be so mad as to doubt the truth of 

 such primary dicta, he must logically doubt of every other 

 affirmation whatever, even that of his own doubt, which thus 

 destroys itself. Absolute scepticism, and consequently utter 

 intellectual paralysis, are the inevitable logical results of any 

 real doubt in this matter of our own existence. 



There is another point of which we should make sure in 

 examining the activity of our own minds. To have a know 

 ledge of anything is one thing ; to know that we have that 

 knowledge is another, and a very different thing. We cognize 

 an object e.g., a crow flying by one act ; we cognize that 

 cognition by a very different act. To judge that one moun 

 tain is higher than another is one mental act ; to recognise 

 that mental act as a judgment is an act of a very different 

 kind. Yet both these are judgments. To feel to have a 

 sensation, then, is indeed a different thing from recognising 

 such sensation as ours, or as being one of a particular class 

 of sensations. 



Our knowledge of ourselves as being the same person 

 no.v as in the past, implies the trustworthiness of memory 

 one of the most wonderful of our many wonderful facul 

 ties. Now by a little further introspection we may easily 

 organic and see that memory is of two kinds (1) Involuntary, 

 memo e ry ual passive, unconscious, sensitive memory to our 

 present possession of which we do not advert ; and (2) Volun 

 tary, active, conscious, intellectual memory, which we re- 



