CHAP. VII.] THE BRUTE. 199 



rational speech. It will not, probably, be contended by any 

 naturalist that Instinct ever rises to such a height as this, but 

 many assert that it contains such faculties, potentially and in 

 germ, and that there is, as Mr. Darwin says, no difference of 

 kind, but only one of degree, between it and reason. 



Since we are unable to converse with brutes,* we can but 

 divine and infer from their gestures, motions, and Danger of a 



- special fal- 



the sounds they emit, what may be the nature ot lacy, 

 their highest physical powers. Now, in this process of infer 

 ence, we necessarily risk being guilty of a fallacy similar to 

 that of which a certain school of Theology has shown us a 

 conspicuous instance. 



The whole process of reasoning being a progression to the 

 unknown by means of the known, we can of course only define 

 the former in terms of the latter. All our knowledge having 

 human sensible experience as its necessary condition, scientific 

 language can only make use of terms which primarily denote 

 such human experiences. Thus, when men speak of God and 

 of his attributes, they are, of course, necessarily limited to 

 terms primarily denoting human sensible experiences, and 

 hence arises the danger of theological anthropomorphism. In 

 the temporary philosophical decline which has accompanied 

 the rise of physical science, very many modern theologians, 

 neglecting the old rational conception of a Deus analogus, 

 have been asserting a Deus univocus with the natural result 

 of producing the modern opposite error of asserting a Deus 

 tequivocus. In other words, the absurdity of asserting that 

 the terms which denote powers and qualities in man have the 

 very same meaning when also applied to God, has naturally 

 led to the opposite absurdity of denying that there is any 

 relation whatever between certain terms as applied to God, 



* Professor Huxley ( Contemporary Review for November 1871, p. 4G4) 

 has asked the singular question : &quot; What is the value of the evidence which 

 leads one to believe that one s fellow-man feels? The only evidence in this 

 argument of analogy, is the similarity of his structure and of his actions to 

 one s own.&quot; Surely it is not by similarity of structure or actions, but by lan 

 guage, that men are placed in communication with one another, and that 

 the rational intellect of each perceives the rationality and sensibility of his 

 fellow-man. 



