CHAP. VII.] THE BRUTE. 211 



&quot;reason&quot; into play is gratuitous. The circumstances can 

 be perfectly explained (and on Mr. Darwin s own principles) 

 as evidences of the revival of an old instinct. The ancestors 

 of sporting dogs of course killed their prey, and that trained 

 dogs do not do so is simply due to man s action, which has 

 suppressed the instinct by education and which so continu 

 ally keeps it under control. It is indubitable that the old 

 tendency must be latent, and that a small interruption in the 

 normal retrieving process, such as occurred in the cases cited, 

 would probably be sufficient to revive it and call the obso 

 lete habit into exercise. 



But perhaps the most surprising instance of groundless 

 inference is presented in the following passage : 



&quot; My clog, a ful] -grown and very sensible animal, was lying on the 

 lawn during a hot and stillday ; but at a little distance a slight breeze 

 occasionally moved an open parasol, which would have been wholly dis 

 regarded by the dog, had any one stood near it. As it was, every time 

 that the parasol slightly moved, the dog growled fiercely and barked. 

 He must, I think, have reasoned to himself in a rapid and unconscious 

 manner, that movement without any apparent cause indicated the pre 

 sence of some strange living agent, and no stranger had a right to be 

 on his territory.&quot; vol. i. p. 67. 



The consequences deduced from this trivial incident are 

 amazing. Probably, however, Mr. Darwin does not mean 

 what he says ; but, on the face of it, we have a brute credited 

 with the abstract ideas &quot; movement,&quot; &quot; causation,&quot; and the 

 notions logically arranged and classified in subordinate 

 genera &quot; agent,&quot; living agent,&quot; &quot;strange living agent.&quot; 

 He also attributes to it the notion of &quot; a right &quot; of &quot; terri 

 torial limitation,&quot; and the relation of such &quot;limited terri 

 tory &quot; and &quot; personal ownership.&quot; It may safely be affirmed 

 that if a dog could so reason in one instance he would in 

 others, and would give much more unequivocal proofs for 

 Mr. Darwin s use. 



Mr. Darwin, however, speaks of reasoning in an &quot;un 

 conscious manner,&quot; so that he cannot really mean any pro 

 cess of reasoning at all ; but, if so, his case is in no way 

 apposite. Even, an insect can be startled, and will exhibit 



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