218 LESSONS FROM NATURE. [CHAP. VII. 



the cosmos, but he also thinks it.&quot; Problems of Life and Mind, vol. i. 

 pp. 123, 124. 



Again he says : 



&quot; Circles differ from circles in degree ; they differ from ellipses in 

 kind. Whether large or small the circle has the same properties, and 

 these are different from the properties of the ellipse. It is true that by 

 insensible gradations the circle may flatten into an ellipse, or the two 

 foci of the ellipse may blend into one, and form a circle. But so long 

 as there are two foci, the ellipse has its characteristic properties. In 

 like manner the boundaries of the animal and human may be found 

 insensibly blending at certain points ; but whenever the animal circle 

 has become transformed into the human ellipse, by the introduction 

 of a second centre, the difference ceases to be one of degree, and becomes 

 one of kind, the germ of infinite variations.&quot; Op. tit. pp. 153, 154. 



This remarkable passage contains even a stronger argu 

 ment in favour of the distinctness in kind between the 

 faculties of men and brutes, even than Mr. Lewes himself 

 intends. It does so because Mr. Lewes is wrong in saying 

 that &quot; by insensible grades the circle may flatten into an 

 ellipse.&quot; With the least degree of flattening, the figure 

 ceases absolutely to be a circle, although our senses may 

 fail to detect the aberration. Mr. Lewes also admits* that 

 brutes have &quot; no conceptions, no general ideas, no symbols 

 of logical operations,&quot; and affirms that the absurdity of 

 thinking brutes could be rational 



&quot;is so glaring, that we need not wonder at profoundly meditative 

 minds having been led to reject with scorn the hypothesis which seeks 

 for an explanation of human intelligence in the functions of the bodily 

 organism common to man and animals, and having had recourse to the 

 hypothesis of a spiritual agent superadded to the organism.&quot; Op. cit. 

 p. 157. 



He also sayst that &quot;animal imagination is reproduc 

 tive, but not plastic : it never constructs ;&quot; and describes 

 the &quot;knowledge&quot; of the brute as &quot;such registrations of 

 experience as suffice to guide his actions in the satisfac 

 tion of immediate impulses.&quot; In addition to all this, he 



Op. cit. pp. 154, 155. t Op. cit. p. 169. 



t Op. cit. p. 250. 



