CHAP. VII.] THE BKUTE. 227 



affirmation or judgment. For, in this particular judgment, of what is 

 green affirmed? Of this plant called grass. But green is a part 

 of the object grass as it comes to the sense. The sense knows no 

 such thing as green and no such thing as grass existing separately, 

 over against each other, comparably ; it only knows a particular plant 

 which would not (by hypothesis) be this particular plant at all unless 

 it were green. And therefore, just as the term green in the affirma 

 tion contains in it an element not furnished by sense, so does the other 

 term grass. It is evident then, that not only must Ave say of a 

 judgment that the relation it expresses by the word is cannot have 

 been furnished by sense-impressions, but we must also say that the 

 very terms of that relation or judgment must also have been derived 

 from another source. 



&quot; It need hardly be insisted that the terms of this judgment, let 

 alone the is of the judgment, are independent of space and time. 

 Not only so, but they so absolutely exclude and transcend space and 

 time that to think them under space and time would be to destroy 

 them. Green, as we have so often said, is not this greenness, but 

 greenness in general ; but no such thing as greenness in general exists 

 in rerum natura, or can be conceived to exist. But if greenness be 

 thought under space (so much) and time (so long) then it is no longer 

 greenness, but some green thing. And grass also, in the judgment, 

 is independent of space and time. For to judge that grass is green 

 implies, as we have said, a mental separation of this grass from its 

 greenness; for you cannot compare two things between which no 

 separation exists. 



&quot; But this grass does not exist in space or time separated from its 

 greenness ; and so far as it is thought under space and time, it actually 

 is (the same as) green. Therefore as it occurs in the given judgment, 

 it excludes space and time. And the same reasoning might be made 

 as strongly in regard to the copula, is. If a brute could think is 

 brute and man would be brothers. Is/ as the copula of a judgment, 

 implies the mental separation and recombination of two terms that 

 only exist united in nature, and can therefore never have impressed 

 the sense except as one thing. And is considered as a substantive 

 verb, as in the example This man is, contains in itself the application 

 of the copula of judgment to the most elementary of all abstractions 

 thing, or something. Yet if a being has the power of thinking 

 thing, it has the power of transcending space and time by dividing 

 or decomposing the phenomenally one. Here is the point where 

 instinct ends and reason begins.&quot; 



This author also well remarks* that excess of sensation 

 paralyses the sense, disintegrating the tissues; but with 



* Op. eft. p. 33. 



Q 2 



