CHAP. VII.] THE BRUTE. 233 



of a free will in God, and, as a matter of fact, he does admit 

 it in the devil.&quot; &quot; But the final consideration, which puts a 

 great gulf between the determinist and the predestinarian, is 

 this, that the latter asserts the reality of the vulgar notion of 

 moral desert. Even if he were not obliged by his interpreta 

 tion of Scripture to assert this, he would be obliged to assert 

 it in order to help out his doctrine of eternal reprobation.&quot; 



Keverting to our subject, it seems, at least, that I have 

 Professor Huxley with me when I assert that there are no 

 grounds for considering brutes as anything more than sen 

 tient automata, and thus Instinct becomes, in a certain 

 degree, intelligible to us through our own lower psychical 

 faculties. As animals have reflex action, so also have we ; as 

 animals have direct and indeliberate sentient (i.e., instinctive) 

 action, so have we ; but that we have also vastly more, 

 enough, it is hoped, has been said even in this chapter to 

 make manifest. 



But can any further light be thrown upon the nature of 

 Instinct than that derivable from its comparison with our 

 lower mental powers ? 



Mr. Lewes and Mr. Herbert Spencer agree in entertaining 

 a very singular view as to Instinct namely, that it f 



* Curious 



is superior to intelligence, in that either by its ^ n s at a u s r e of 

 failure it becomes intelligence, or that it is itself Instinct - 

 &quot; lapsed intelligence.&quot; Mr. Spencer, indeed, shortly de 

 scribes * Instinct as &quot;compound reflex action&quot; a complex 

 reflex action, in which sensation intervenes, established by 

 the &quot; survival of the fittest ;&quot; and, as it becomes more and 

 more compound, failing to be so ready and decided in its 

 action, and so becoming &quot; intelligence.&quot; Thus, according to 

 this author, &quot; Reason &quot; is a negative entity a failure of In 

 stinct! It may be mentioned, by the way, that, in his 

 chapter on Instinct, Mr. Spencer shirks considering the most 

 difficult phenomena, saying not a word of such instincts as 

 those of ants, termites, and the wasp Sphex. 



* Psychology, vol. ii. p. 433. 



