234 LESSONS FKOM NATUEE. [CHAP. VII. 



Mr. Lewes tells* us : 



&quot; In instinct there is not intelligence, but what was once intelligence ; 

 the specially intelligent character has disappeared in the fixed ten 

 dency. The action which was tentative, discriminative, has now become 



automatic and irresistible The objection will doubtless be 



raised that instinct is wholly destitute of the characteristic of intelli 

 gence in that it has no choice ; its operation is fixed, fatal. The reply 

 is twofold : in the first place, the objection, so far as it has validity, 

 applies equally to judgment, where, given the premisses, the conclusion 

 is fatal, no alternative being open. Axioms, in this sense, are logical 

 instincts. Thus, the higher intellectual process is on a level with this 

 process said to be its opposite. And in the second place, the element of 

 choice always does enter into instinct; although the intelligent dis 

 crimination of means to ends may be almost absent, it never is entirely. 

 The guiding sensation which directs the impulse is always selective. If 

 we restrict intelligence to the logic of signs, to ideas, there cannot of 

 course be anything intelligent in instinct ; but if we extend it as we 

 must to the logic of feeling, the dispute will cease.&quot; Problems of 

 Life and Mind, p. 130, note, and p. 141. 



Now, this passage is worthy of notice as the latest declara 

 tion of the Sensist school on this question. But, in the first 

 place, we affirm that not to restrict intelligence to intellect is 

 absurd a contradiction in terms &quot;ideas&quot; not &quot;feelings&quot; 

 being the exclusive domain of the intellect. That there is a 

 logic in feeling that there is a logic in even unsentient 

 nature we are far from denying ; but that logic is not the 

 logic of the crystal nor of the brute, but of their Creator. 

 Mr. Lewes evidently here means by &quot; choice &quot; not a deliberate, 

 self-conscious process, but a direct, indeliberate action, such 

 as may automatically result from the association of sensible 

 impressions. Indeliberate actions of this kind are not to be 

 denied to brutes, but they are not acts of Reason, though 

 they are often enough made use of by rational beings, just as 

 digestion and secretion are not acts of &quot; Reason,&quot; though they 

 are acts of a rational being who digests and secretes. 



Mr. Lewes s first answer ignores the very main distinction 

 between Instinct and Reason namely, the presence of self- 

 conscious intellectual action in the latter, and its absence in 



* The italics are mine. 



