240 LESSONS FEOM NATURE. [CHAP. VII. 



elephant ? To such objectors I would reply How can you 

 show that your conception of matter as it exists is adequate ? 

 Matter pure and simple, the materia prima of philosophy, 

 nowhere exists actually, nor ever did so exist. Every form 

 of matter known to us, even the simplest, possesses certain 

 active powers, and is combined with a definite &quot; form.&quot; New 

 combinations and collocations of matter are continually 

 evoking new forms, presenting to us other powers before 

 unknown to us. What right, then, has any one to deny the 

 existence in matter of latent potentialities which experience 

 and reason combine to show us are now actually there, and, 

 in all probability, have been latent antecedently? That 

 matter should show us actions which embody a quasi intel 

 ligence is the less surprising when we reflect that all nature 

 teems with such unconscious intelligence. Eeason, order, and 

 activity pervade the material universe the mineral as well 

 as the animal and vegetable kingdoms. But, apart from man, 

 A new en- sucn reason is in no material being conscious of 

 itself; and the soul of man is, as we have seen, dif 

 ferent in kind from the soul of every brute, and may there 

 fore, as we have also seen, rationally claim another origin. 

 The resemblance of the unconscious infant (whose instincts 

 are less developed than those of many new-born beasts) 

 to a mere animal, is but a superficial one, and results 

 only from the imperfection of our powers of observation. 

 That from the first the whole difference is latent, the result 

 proves. It is like the superficial resemblance of an em 

 bryonic reptile to an embryonic bird, or even of an embryonic 

 beast to an embryonic fish. The reptile never is a bird, nor 

 the beast a fish, though the immature stages of development 

 are superficially alike. 



If the history of mankind is sketched out by that of the 

 child s development, then we may conclude that man was 

 never a mere animal. Instinct and Eeason seem to form 

 two distinct regions two distinct kinds of activity whereof 

 the former serves as the material for the latter. In order 

 that mere instinctive faculties may become rational, there is 



