CHAP. XII.] CAUSES. 361 



Hence we get the formal law of Cosmical Evolution 

 whereof Mr. Spencer s law is the material expres- v 



* Formal law 



sion. Inis formal law may be defined as the con- of Kvolution - 

 tinuous progress of the material universe by the unfolding 

 of latent potentialities through the action of incident forces 

 (i.e., through the interaction of its parts) in harmony with 

 a preordained end, such unfolding exhibiting a succession 

 of changes from indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to definite 

 coherent heterogeneity. 



But if the conception of an Infinite and Absolute Being, 

 Omniscient, Omnipotent, and Holy, be thus taught Non-theistic 

 by Nature, what are the causes of its non-acceptance spencer s/ 

 by prominent teachers of science and philosophy in our own 

 day ? What reasons are brought forward against it ? 



Mr. Herbert Spencer is the most decided upholder of the 

 necessity and truth of a conception of a First Cause. But 

 this he speaks of as the Unknowable, and denies our right 

 to ascribe to it any attribute other than existence, or to 

 attribute to it personality. But, in the first place, not to 

 speak of it by that term is practically to degrade it to a lower 

 level than ourselves, though this is by no means Mr. Spencer s 

 intention. It t has this practical effect, because we cannot 

 conceive anything as impersonal and yet of a higher nature 

 than our own. And, indeed, this circumstance is not owing 

 to a mere mental impotence, but to a positive and clear per 

 ception. For to be a person, means to be a being possessing 

 knowledge and will; and any being which has not these 

 faculties must be indefinitely inferior to one which has them. 

 The First Cause, as the cause of all knowledge including 

 knowledge of good and evil, and all power of will must be 

 adequate to their production. He must possess therefore 

 attributes analogous to these qualities as known in ourselves, 

 though of course infinite in degree. Personality therefore 

 must be predicated of the First Cause, under pain of violating 

 the primary dicta of our reason. 



The inadequacy and, to speak plainly, the absurdity of this 

 &quot;Unknowable&quot; has been considered in the twelfth chapter 



