CHAP. XII.] CAUSES. 367 



vagance &quot; has resulted in providing us with our coal treasure 

 a worthy gift of thoughtful and provident beneficence. 



But the idea of God implies the one cause of all the pro 

 cesses of nature. He wills and intends them all, and there 

 fore whatever results must be a fulfilment of His intention. 

 When the matter of the artist s or the philosopher s brain 

 comes to feed worms, it fulfils God s purpose no less than 

 when it energises in creations of genius or of wisdom. It is 

 as impossible for any accident to defeat the purpose of Him 

 whose will ordains every process, as it is for the irreligious 

 man, by his voluntary revolt and anti-religious efforts, to do 

 other than stultify himself by hastening on the fulfilment of 

 God s own purpose. 



It may not be uninteresting to some of my readers to see 

 how clearly this conception, which seems so to escape An old an _ 

 the grasp of our modern &quot; advanced &quot; thinkers, was swer&amp;gt; 

 a familiar idea in the thirteenth century. St. Thomas 

 Aquinas * on this matter says : &quot; Quod si aliqua causa parti- 

 cularis deficiat a suo effectu, hoc est propter aliquam causam 

 particularem impediantem qua3 continetur sub ordine causse 

 universalis. Unde effectus ordinem causse universalis nullo 

 modo potest exire.&quot; . . . . &quot; Sicut indigestio contingit praeter 

 ordinem virtutis nutritive ex aliquo impedimento, porta ex 

 grossitie cibi, quam necesse est reducere in aliam causam, et 

 sic usque ad causam primam universalem. Cum igitur Deus 

 sit prim a causa universalis non unius generis tantum, sed 

 universaliter totius cutis, impossibile est quod aliquid contin- 

 gat proeter ordinem divine gubernationis ; sed ex hoc ipse 

 quod aliquid ex una parte videtur exire at ordine divinae 

 providentiee, quo consideratur secundam aliquam particula 

 rem causam, necesse est quod in eundem ordinem relabatur 

 secundum aliam causam.&quot; 



The second objection (that to the Omnipotence of the 

 First Cause), in so far as it relates to failure of sec 

 purpose, has been answered in answering the first t] 



* &amp;lt; Summa Theol., p. i. Q. 19, A. 6, and Q. 103, A. 7. 



