120 COSMIC PHILOSOPHY. [ PT . ix. 



spates of consciousness? and the kind of mental action is 

 regarded as high or low, according to the greater or less 

 extent to which the differentiation and integration are carried. 

 The phenomena of conscious intelligence are thus seen to 

 conform to the universal law of evolution ; and we may 

 further note that this conclusion is entirely in harmony with 

 the definition of psychical life as the continuous adjustment 

 of inner to outer relations. For clearly, when an intelligence 

 is developing in the midst of a complex environment, the 

 greater the number of subjective relations which are adjusted 

 to objective relations, the greater will be the extent to which 

 the differentiation and integration of conscious states will be 

 carried. 



Here we may seern to have arrived at a satisfactory con 

 clusion of our analysis. But the lowest depths of the pro 

 blem yet remain to be sounded, as will be seen when we 

 consider a superficial objection not unfrequently urged against 

 the foregoing views. Alike in all the mental operations 

 which have formed the subject-matter of our analysis, we 

 have seen that the relations of likeness and unlikeness enter 

 ing into the case are classified with certain other relations of 

 likeness and unlikeness previously cognized. The thought 

 which determines the astronomer in calculating the moon s 

 distance, implies previous experience of triangles and of 

 numerical relations. In the classification of a giraffe there 

 is implied previous acquaintance with the complex relations 

 of structure and function connoted by the terms ruminant, 

 ungulate, monodelpliian, mammal, vertebrate, and animal. 

 The perception of an apple implies numerous antecedent 

 experiences of colour, size, configuration, smoothness, odour, 

 and taste. And in like manner, though we have provisionally 

 defined a sensation as an &quot; elementary state of conscious 

 ness,&quot; yet we have also seen that, in order to become truly 

 conscious of a sensation, we must know it, or, in other words, 

 must classify it with some like sensation previously felt 



