CH. xvn.J SOCIOLOGY AND FKEE-WILL. 179 



indefinitely complex and variable in their mutual combina 

 tions and oppositions, are simultaneously operative. But 

 however numerous or complicated the forces at work, from 

 whatever source the motives to action or inaction arise, what 

 ever be the nature of the incentives to one kind of conduct 

 or to some other kind, it is equally true that the result 

 depends upon their comparative strength. Indeed, since 

 forces can be measured only by their effects, to say that 

 of two conflicting motives one is followed by volition, is to 

 call that motive the stronger one. &quot; Our only evidence of 

 excess of force is the movement it produces &quot; ; and when the 

 ancient engineer wished to ascertain the comparative power 

 of a couple of catapults, he had no alternative but to see 

 which would hurl its stone to the greater distance. To say 

 explicitly that volition does not follow the strongest motive, 

 is to say implicitly that motion does not always follow the 

 line of least resistance; which is to deny the persistence 

 of force. 



Volition being accordingly regarded as the process whereby 

 feeling initiates action, it becomes evident that the term 

 &quot; free &quot; is no more applicable to it than the term &quot; copper- 

 coloured.&quot; As Mr. Bain observes ; &quot; The designation liberty 

 of choice has no real meaning, except as denying extraneous 

 interference. If I am interfered with by another person com 

 pelling me to act in one way, then it may be said, intel 

 ligibly enough, that I have not liberty of choice. But, as 

 between the different motives of my own mind, there is no 

 meaning in the use of the word liberty/ Various motives, 

 present or prospective pleasures and pains, concur in urging 

 me to act. The result of the conflict shows that one group is 

 stronger than another, and that is the whole case.&quot; 1 Or, 

 as M. Littre has still more forcibly reminded us, the term 

 &quot; liberty,&quot; as applied to volition, means the power of obeying 

 ihe strongest motive. When that power is interfered with, 



1 Bain, The Emotion and the Will, 1st edit. p. 550. 



N 2 



