CH. xvii.] SOCIOLOGY AND FEEE-W1 IL. 183 



whether the actions of men are normally free, but whether their 

 freedom is consistent with their being caused. The assertors 

 of &quot;Tree-Will&quot; maintain that causation is inconsistent with 

 liberty. 1 The so-called necessarians assert that liberty and 

 causation are quite consistent with each other. To which we 

 must now add, that it is not causation, but the absence 

 thereof, which is as incompatible with liberty as it is with law. 

 For the causationist, believing that volition invariably 

 follows the stronger motive, endeavours to increase the 

 relative strength of all those emotions whose outcome is 

 virtuous and upright conduct, while he strives to weaken 

 those feelings whose tendency is toward base and ignoble 

 conduct. Knowing that by continual indulgence desire is rein 

 forced, while by constant repression it is enfeebled, he applies 

 this knowledge to the control of his will and the discipline of 

 his character. But on tl e theory that volitions are causeless, 

 all methods of self-discipline become of no avail. If they 

 are powerless to influence action, it is of small practical 

 importance whether noble and sympathetic or base and selfish 

 motives are prevalent ; and the moral distinction between 

 them loses most of its significance. Why, asks Mr. Smith, 

 &quot;is a Philip II. more the subject of moral disapprobation 

 than the plague?&quot; Why, indeed, unless his atrocious crimes 

 are to be interpreted as the necessary outgrowth of a character 

 wherein good motives were impotent and bad motives all- 

 powerful. Were volition self-determining, then similar acts 



1 &quot;The law of bondage throughout the universe is the law of cause and 

 effect. In the violation, then, of tliis law, true freedom must consist.&quot; 

 Ferrier, Lectures and Philosophical Remains, vol. ii. p. 255. One might 

 expect such a remark as this trom Mr. Golchvin Smith, who speaks of being 

 &quot;hound by the chain of certain causation&quot;; but from so acute a thinker 

 as Prof. Ferrier, it is surprising. To adopt, in a somewhat altered sense, 

 Kant s happy illustration, the spectacle of a bird denouncing as an encum 

 brance the air by which alone it is enabled to fly, would be a fitting parallel 

 to the spectacle of those philosophers who decry that regularity of sequence 

 through which alone has &quot;freedom&quot; any meaning. As Leasing long ago 

 said, with well-bestowed contempt, &quot; LP beau privilege d etre soumis a une 

 puissance aveugle qui ne suit aucune regie ! n serait-je m&ins le jouet du 

 kasard parce gut ce hasard rtsiderait en moil&quot; 



