ca. xxii.] GENESIS OF MAN, MORALLY. 351 



horrible cruelty of tying his enemy to a tree and slowly 

 burning him to death with firebrands. To the Indians 

 described by Mr. Parkman, such villany formed the most 

 delightful of recreations. 



Thus, though the savage has the germ of a moral sense, 

 which prompts him, irrespective of utilitarian considerations, 

 to postpone his personal welfare to that of his clan, he can 

 by no means be accredited with a fully developed moral sense. 

 And the incentives which influence him are not what we 

 call moral sentiments, in the strict sense of the phrase. 

 &quot; They are simply sentiments that precede and make possible 

 those highest sentiments which do not refer either to personal 

 benefits or evils to be expected from men, or to more remote 

 rewards and punishments.&quot; The lower incentives have 

 indeed continued to exert a powerful, perhaps a predomina 

 ting, influence down to the present time. So long as readers 

 are found for ethical treatises, like that of Jonathan Dymond, 

 in which the sole ground of moral obligation is held to be 

 the supernatural ly revealed fiat of an anthropomorphic Deity ; 

 &quot; while sermons set forth the torments of the damned and 

 the joys of the blessed as the chief deterrents and incentives, 

 and while we have prepared for us printed instructions how 

 to make the best of both worlds ; it cannot be denied that 

 the feelings which impel and restrain men are still largely 

 composed of elements like those operative on the savage, 

 the dread, partly vague, partly specific, associated with the 

 idea of reprobation, human and divine, and the sense of 

 satisfaction, partly vague, partly specific, associated with the 

 idea of approbation, human and divine.&quot; 1 But a sound 

 ethical philosophy regards it as degrading to perform good 

 actions or to refrain from performing bad actions merely in 

 order to win applause or to secure a place in heaven. Some- 

 v hing metre is needed to complete our account of tlio moral 



B6I1S3. 



1 Spencer, Principles of Psychology, voL ii. p. 602. 



