380 COSMIC PHILOSOPHY. [PT. IIL 



of historic testimony, such as can be produced, suffices to 

 make him entertain the hypothesis for an instant. Hence it 

 is that such critics as Strauss and Renan, to the great disgust 

 of theologians, always assume, prior to argument, that mira 

 culous narratives are legendary. Hence it is that when the 

 slowly dying belief in miracles finally perishes, it will not be 

 because any one will ever have refuted it by an array of 

 syllogisms : the syllogisms of the theologian and those of the 

 thinker trained in science have no convincing power as 

 against each other, because neither accepts the major premise 

 of the other: but it will be because the belief is discordant 

 with the mental habits induced by the general study of 

 science. Hence it is that the scientific philosopher is averse 

 to proselytism, and has no sympathy with radical infidelity. 

 For he knows that theological habits of thought are relatively 

 useful, while scepticism, if permanent, is intellectually and 

 morally pernicious. Knowing this, he knows that the only 

 way to destroy theological habits of thought without detri 

 ment, is to nurture scientific habits, which stifle the former, 

 as surely as clover stifles weeds. 



The belief that God works after quasi-human methods is 

 akin to those just cited, in being incapable of proof or dis 

 proof by mere syllogism. Our business is only to determine 

 whether the arguments in favour of it are calculated to con 

 vince those who insist upon the relativity of all knowledge, 

 and whether the belief itself can be made to harmonize with 

 the scientific truths upon which our Cosmic Philosophy is 

 based. Let us begin by examining the doctrine of final 

 causes, as defended by metaphysical arguments ; and let ns 

 afterwards observe how this famous argument from design is 

 affected by the theory of evolution. 



