en. IT.] ANTHEOPOMOEPHIC THEISM. 409 



idea &quot;Infinite Person&quot; is neither more nor less un 

 thinkable than the pseud-idea &quot; Circular Triangle.&quot; As 

 Spinoza somewhere says, Determinatio negatio cst, to define 

 God is to deny Him ; arid such being the case, what can be 

 more irrational than to insist upon thought and volition, 

 phenomena only known to exist within quite narrow limita 

 tions, as the very nature and essence of the infinite Deity ? 

 What theory of physical or moral phenomena, built upon 

 such an inadequate basis, can be other than unsound and 

 misleading? What wonder if it continually land us in 

 awkward and conflicting conclusions, painful to us alike 

 as inquiring and as religious beings ? As Goethe has pro 

 foundly said, &quot;Since the great Being whom we name the 

 Deity manifests himself not only in man, but in a rich 

 and powerful Nature, and in mighty world-events, a 

 representation of Him, framed from human qualities, can 

 not of course be adequate, and the thoughtful observer 

 will soon corne to imperfections and contradictions, which 

 will drive him to doubt nay, even to despair unless he 

 be either little enough to let himself be soothed by an 

 artful evasion, or great enough to rise to a higher point of 

 view.&quot; * To those whom the habits of thought which science 

 nurtures have led to believe in the existence of an all-per 

 vading and all-sustaining Power, eternally and everywhere 

 manifested in the phenomenal activity of the universe, alike 

 the cause of all and the inscrutable essence of all, without 

 whom the world would be as the shadow of a vision, and 

 thought itself would vanish, to these the conception of a 

 presiding anthropomorphic Will is a gross and painful con 

 ception. Even were it the highest phenomenal conception 

 which can be framed, it would still be inadequate to re 

 present the Ineffable Pieality. But we do not and cannot 

 know even that it is the highest. Hegel was rash with 

 all the metaphysician s rashness when he said that Humanity 



1 Eckeriuann, vol. ii. p. 357. 



