Meth ods of Eth ics. 1 1 



shall be much deceived. Far more than this is 

 included in those first principles in virtue of which 

 morality is to be placed amongst the sciences 

 capable of demonstration. They comprise &quot;the 

 idea of a Supreme Being, infinite in power, good 

 ness, and wisdom, whose workmanship we are, 

 and on whom we depend ; and the idea of our 

 selves, as understanding, rational beings.&quot; 



But the admission of even such principles does 

 not assimilate the scientific character of ethics to 

 that of mathematics. It seems to do so only be 

 cause of the inveterate, though ungrounded, habit 

 of regarding mathematical truths as deductions 

 from given first principles. So long as the theo 

 rems of geometry and algebra are imagined to 

 follow from the axioms and definitions with the 

 same inner necessity as a syllogistic conclusion 

 from its major and minor premises, so long must 

 the procedure of mathematics appear applicable 

 to ethics when once the latter has discovered suit 

 able starting-points. For both sciences are thus 

 conceived as merely specialized forms of logic. 

 This, however, is to overlook precisely the essen 

 tial point. If ratiocination in ethics, as in logic, 

 gives us no new information, leaving us in the 

 issue exactly where we stood at the outset, there 

 is, on the contrary, in the demonstrations of 



