14 Lockes First Principles. 



It follows, too, that in the analytic deduction 

 of moral rules from Locke s first principles the 

 idea of a Supreme Being, on whom we depend, and 

 of ourselves as rational beings the difficulties at 

 taching to our conception of moral rules are not 

 removed, but simply refunded into the assumed 

 first principles. If they are not immediately vis 

 ible there it is only because the assumptions are 

 so much vaster than this particular application of 

 them that our special problem is overshadowed 

 by the larger issues to which its solution has 

 given rise. But a moment s reflection will show 

 that the debated points of morals cannot be made 

 to disappear, even at the theistic point of view. 

 ; And it is a matter of history that theistic moral- 

 ; ists fall into the same ethical antagonisms as the 

 \ sceptics do. Paley and Butler, Edwards and Kant, 

 are, in some respects, as fundamental oppositions 

 as the whole history of ethics presents. 



!Nor is the fact really surprising. For the idea 

 of a Supreme Being, on whom man depends, con 

 tains no information about man s moral nature, 

 or the end of his conduct, or his specific duties 

 and obligations. You cannot deduce from that 

 idea the character of conscience or will ; it does 

 not supply you with a standard of morality ; it 

 does not show you in particular cases what you 



