The Metaphysics of Darwinism. 89 



ISTow, in organic beings in a state of nature the 

 struggle for life effects what man s purposive 

 selection effects for domesticated animals ; by re 

 moving other forms it leaves only those with cer 

 tain peculiar modifications free to breed together. 

 It is true that in the one case these modifications 

 are such as are pleasing or useful to man ; in the 

 other they are such as are serviceable to the indi 

 vidual in its competition with rivals. &quot; Man selects 

 only for his own good ; nature only for that of the 

 being which she tends.&quot; But the main point is 

 that, just as domestic varieties arise from the se 

 lective breeding practised by man, natural varie 

 ties, which are &quot; incipient species,&quot; arise from 

 that selective breeding due to the killing out of 

 competing, but less-favored, forms in the strug 

 gle for existence. And this natural selection, 

 Darwin holds, is as much superior to human se 

 lection as the works of nature are to art. &quot; As 

 man,&quot; he tells us in a striking passage, &quot; can pro 

 duce a great result with his domestic animals and 

 plants by adding up in any given direction indi 

 vidual differences, so could natural selection, but 

 far more easily, from having incomparably longer 

 time for action.&quot; 



It has been objected that this attribution of 

 superior potency to natural selection, in compari- 



