Darwinism in Ethics. 121 



no longer necessarily subject to change with the 

 changing universe.&quot; 



Simultaneous with this revolution was another, 

 scarcely less significant, due to the appearance 

 and operation of the moral sentiments. The 

 moral being lives for others as well as for him 

 self. But the lower animals are at best grega 

 rious, not social ; they lead a life of individual 

 isolation and self-dependence. Each is alone, in 

 the battle for life, exposed to the whole force of 

 the combat. The sick and the feeble fall victims 

 to beasts of prey or die of starvation. There is 

 no division of labor to relieve the one from di 

 rectly procuring its own food, no mutual assist 

 ance to succor the other till health and visror are 



3 



restored. Accordingly, any group of animals en 

 dowed with the least tincture of sociality and 

 sympathy would, through the internal union and 

 strength which these qualities evoke, have a de 

 cided advantage over other groups not thus en 

 dowed. A tribe animated by these instincts con 

 tains in itself a principle of survival of scarcely 

 less efficacy than the mental faculties themselves. 

 If these check the action of natural selection on 

 the body, and transfer it to the sphere of intelli 

 gence, the social and sympathetic feelings screen 

 the individual and oppose to the play of natural 



