132 Account of Obligation. 



out of the relation of subject to ruler and of in 

 dividual to tribe. The coerciveness which now 

 forms so important a constituent in our conscious 

 ness of duty is a survival of the constraint with 

 which primitive man was forced by external 

 agencies into certain lines of conduct and deterred 

 from others. And hence it follows that, as 

 morality is differentiated more completely from 

 the legal, political, and social institutions in which 

 it originated, the feeling of obligation generated 

 by them will gradually fade away. Thus the 

 evolutiono-utilitarian account of obligation dis 

 covers it a transitional feature in the process of 

 human &quot; moralization,&quot; and this essentially is all 

 that it adds to the theory of Mill and Bain. 



This newest theory of morals, here too briefly 

 outlined, embraces in its range the entire province 

 of moral conceptions and sentiments. But from 

 what has been said the general character of the 

 system will be readily discerned. It is simple, 

 intelligible, and even plausible. That it should 

 have proved fascinating to all, and irresistible to 

 many, of the generation that has so long listened 

 to it with an ardor brooking little distraction from 

 other theories, cannot be a matter of surprise to 

 anyone who has duly considered the facts with 

 which the theory is associated. Borrowed, as 



