Darwinism in Ethics. 133 



they are, either from observation or from well- 

 established sciences, and fitted ingeniously into 

 current evolutionary ethics, they seem to be an 

 organic part of the structure ; and the question of 

 otherwise explaining them is not likely to be 

 raised. Conversely, the full implication of the 

 principles upon which they are here grafted has 

 been left unexplored. And thus, while the new 

 ethical philosophy has been widely accepted, a 

 determination of the bases on which it really 

 rests still remains to be made. This want we 

 must now attempt to supply. 



In the first place, then, evolutionary ethics, as 

 hitherto presented, takes for granted the deriv 

 ative character of morality. I say &quot; as hitherto 

 presented,&quot; because I hope to show in the sequel 

 that there is nothing in the notion of develop 

 ment when applied to morals which necessitates, 

 or which even warrants, the assumption. But our 

 exponents of evolutionism happen to have been 

 trained in the school of Epicurus, Hume, and 

 Bentham, and it is not, on the whole, very sur 

 prising they should have carried the old leaven 

 into the new teaching. What is surprising Js the 

 assumption, so coolly made, that the theory of 

 evolution in some way vouches for the utilitarian 

 ism our moralists associate with it. As though a 



