136 Second Assumption. 



morality is only a means to something else. And 

 there is no logical reason why he should not 

 appropriate the Aristotelian solution that man s 

 highest good consists in the most perfect rational 

 activity, that his supreme end or function is to 

 inform life with reason and make his entire being 

 the embodiment of reason. But, as a matter of 

 fact, most typical evolutionary moralists have 

 selected a very different ethical end pleasure. 

 They have maintained w r ith Mr. Spencer that 

 &quot;the good is universally the pleasurable,&quot; and 

 that conduct is made good or bad solely by its 

 &quot; pleasure-giving and pain -giving effects.&quot; 



Still the evolutionary moralist, even of the de 

 rivative school, is not necessarily committed to this 

 solution of the problem. He may doubt that the 

 supreme end of life is to get and to give the 

 greatest amount of pleasure. And appropriating 

 the language of that Rabelaisian description of 

 Carlyle s, on which Mr. Spencer has poured forth 

 eloquent objurgation, our doubter may question 

 whether the universe is merely &quot;an immeasur 

 able swine s trough,&quot; and whether &quot;moral evil 

 is unattainability of pig s-wash and moral good 

 attainability of ditto.&quot; For certainly the hedon 

 ist cannot, in the absence of antecedent obliga 

 tions which this theory excludes, but deem his 



