Darwinism in Ethics. 13? 



own pleasure the highest good ; and whether ac 

 cepting or not the psychology of the school 

 which teaches that nothing but one s own pleas 

 ure can be the object of desire, he will acquiesce 

 in the ethical dictum of Bentham, that &quot; to at 

 tain the greatest portion of happiness for himself 

 is the object of every rational being.&quot; But as 

 soon as this opposition between his own pleas 

 ures and the pleasures of others is brought dis 

 tinctly into consciousness, and the former recog 

 nized as the end, the impossibility of constructing 

 an ethic on this basis is manifest. There is no 

 way across the chasm that yawns between &quot; each 

 for himself&quot; and &quot;each for others.&quot; And if 

 man be merely a pleasure-seeking animal, you 

 but mock him when you enjoin him to promote 

 the happiness of others. Accordingly, a sincere 

 and logical utilitarian who felt with Mill, that 

 the spirit of his ethics was that of the golden 

 rule of Jesus of Nazareth, would drop altogether 

 the notion of pleasure, which has hitherto filled 

 the system with inconsistencies, and allow the 

 ethical principle, thus freed from the accidental 

 setting of a psychological hedonism, to proclaim 

 itself as the greatest good of the greatest num 

 ber, or, better still, as the well-being of society. 

 Whatever be the content of that well-being (and 



