Danvinism in Ethics. 139 



the assumption that pleasures might through 

 heredity be transformed into duties, have utterly 

 failed. But the simple recognition of the wel 

 fare of society as an ultimate end is not to go 

 outside of morality to find a reason for it, against 

 which the intuitionist has always protested. It is 

 to take one virtue, already recognized by the in 

 tuitionist, for the whole of virtue. And to that 

 extent the two schools are in essential agreement. 

 A difference, however, appears when you inquire 

 if there are not virtues which the general formula 

 of promoting the well-being of others does not 

 embrace. Common-sense seems to say there are 

 other duties as original, as self-evident, and as 

 obligatory, as benevolence. And it does look ra 

 ther incredible that every man should be an end 

 to others and not to himself. We do not easily 

 rid ourselves of the conviction that goodness con 

 sists rather in the realization of a certain type of 

 character in ourselves than in the performance of 

 any external actions, though of course conduct 

 promotive of the welfare of others would be one 

 necessary outcome of the character thus indi 

 cated. 



I come now to a third characteristic assump 

 tion of current evolutionary ethics the fortuitous 

 origin of morality through a process purely me- 



