Darwinism in Ethics. 153 



of the moral consciousness; nor can we imag 

 ine any other way of deriving it which does not 

 already presuppose it. In opposition to this 

 mechanical theory of conscience, we hold that it 

 is an ultimate function of the mind, and that 

 in germ as in full fruition it must be regarded, not 

 as an action, but as an ideal of action. The con 

 sciousness of right and wrong is underived, and, 

 like intelligence in general, witnesses to a supra- 

 sensible principle in man a principle which the 

 wheels of mechanism, grinding through eternity, 

 could never of themselves produce. This view 

 of the subject may be affiliated to Darwinism as 

 readily as the other. For an abiding ideal of ac 

 tion is, to say the least, quite as beneficial as a 

 chance action ; and wherever there is an advan 

 tage, there natural selection may operate. But 

 natural selection does not determine the mate 

 rial upon which it works. Given the forms of 

 primitive morality, whatever they be, natural se 

 lection only settles which shall perish and which 

 survive. Its function is the negative one of sift 

 ing whatever has attained to positive existence. 

 In the book of Job, Satan represents, according 

 to Professor Davidson, the testing, sifting prov 

 idence of God : natural selection is the Satan of 

 the evolutionary powers. Strange, indeed, that it 



