Darwinism in Ethics. 157 



no theory can make ns believe we are hoodwinked 

 into righteousness, truth, and justice, by the mere 

 accident that lying, injustice, and unrighteousness 

 were less useful in holding primitive societies 

 together and enabling them to kill out their 

 rivals. And all this might be conceded by the 

 evolutionist, had he not fallen into the fallacy of 

 holding that, because virtue is socially useful, 

 therefore it is nothing but a social utility. There 

 are other things besides morality which favor the 

 survival of primitive societies. &quot;We have already 

 spoken of the advantages of an erect attitude and 

 of a sound intelligence. Yet the evolutionist 

 does not call these characters mere social utilities. 

 The eye, for example, has no existence among 

 the lowest animals ; yet when it does appear, its 

 own new story is accepted as a fresh revelation 

 of fact. Instead of describing it as an advantage 

 in the struggle for life, the evolutionist sees in 

 the new organ the possibility of a deeper com 

 munion with reality ; and the more developed 

 the organ the more valuable its evidence. The 

 earliest eye was probably nothing more than a 

 tingling sensitiveness to light and darkness. The 

 most developed eye discerns a spectrum of seven 

 colors ; and along with this advance it has also 

 acquired the capacity of measuring distances, 



