Darwin s Ethical Theory. 189 



descriptions a consistent definition of conscience. 

 Yet, without it how are we to test Darwin s the 

 ory of the origin of conscience ? One way is still 

 open. Though we are unable to determine from 

 Dai-win s statements the character of the phe 

 nomenon to be produced, he yet furnishes us with 

 the elements and the process of its production. 

 These we may study in the expectation of dis 

 covering the nature of their result. Given socia 

 bility and intelligence as generating factors of 

 x (&quot; conscience &quot;), the problem is to find x. I 

 repeat, we ought to know what is meant by con 

 science, since this is the phenomenon whose 

 genesis we seek ; but, failing that, nothing re 

 mains but to assume the agencies and operations 

 posited by Darwin, and then examine what they 

 can produce and what they are incapable of pro 

 ducing. 



Turning to the famous chapter already men 

 tioned for Darwin s account of the subject, we 

 learn there is a &quot; main point, on which 

 the whole question of the moral sense turns. 

 Why should a man feel that he ought to obey one 

 instinctive desire rather than another ? . . . 

 Why does he regret having stolen food from 

 hunger ? &quot; 



This problem presents no peculiar difficulty to 



