194 Further Objection. &amp;lt; 



located in a being of high mental powers and 

 that is all the theory postulates what is there 

 to carry the non-moral possessor over into the 

 status of a moral agent ? Evolutionists of the 

 current school are apt to slur over this step, and 

 the hiatus is not observed by their readers be 

 cause, for the most part, they fail to realize that 

 the moral has here been made to emerge, not from 

 an antecedent kindred germ, but from the ab 

 solutely non-moral. When Darwin tells them 

 that a highly intelligent being, reflecting upon the 

 past triumphs of lust, vengeance, or hunger, over 

 more benevolent impulses, cannot escape the bit 

 terness of remorse or shame, they assent to the 

 proposition as expressing a fact of their own ex 

 perience. But they overlook the all-important 

 difference that they are already moral beings, and 

 that the highly intelligent animal Darwin speaks 

 of is not. Why, then, should this non-moral in 

 telligence experience remorse? The selfish in 

 stinct of hunger or lust had its way only because 

 it was at the time stronger than the social check. 

 And in this superior intensity a reflecting, non- 

 moral being could not fail to find its justification. 

 Had the more powerful impulse been restrained, 

 there would have arisen (to appropriate language 

 of Darwin s) &quot; that feeling of dissatisfaction, or 



