Darwin s Ethical Theory. 195 



even misery, which invariably results from any 

 unsatisfied instinct.&quot; And as this misery is pro 

 portionate to the intensity of the impulse sup 

 pressed greater when this is stronger, lighter 

 when it is weaker every reflecting being, unin 

 fluenced by moral considerations, and governed, 

 therefore, only by a Benthamite calculus of pleas 

 ures and pains, would be driven to the inevitable 

 conclusion, that true wisdom consisted in fol 

 lowing the strongest impulse (except when it 

 might entail a future balance of pain a con 

 tingency rarer for non-moral than for moral 

 beings). The case may be represented as fol 

 lows : At a certain moment in the past, a selfish 

 instinct, being stronger than a social instinct, was 

 gratified by the corresponding conduct, and pro 

 duced a clear surplus of pleasure over the pain at 

 tendant upon the violation of the weaker social 

 instinct ; had the latter been satisfied to the 

 suppression of the former, there would, for the 

 same reason, have been a surplus of pain over 

 pleasure. This actual state of things, now, can 

 not be altered by the most arduous reflection upon 

 it. Hence those images of past actions and 

 motives which, according to Darwin, incessantly 

 pass through the minds of highly intelligent ani 

 mals must 3 so far as this particular case is con- 



