196 No Escape From It. 



cerned, generate a pleasurable consciousness akin 

 to that formerly produced by the remembered 

 events themselves. 



The non-moral intelligent being, then, that 

 followed the strongest impulse, be it an egoistic 

 or an altruistic impulse, would have the best 

 reasons for self-gratulation. One consideration, 

 however, as already hinted, might suffice to give 

 him pause. The strongest instinct, though pro 

 ducing the most pleasure momentarily by its 

 gratification, might not produce the greatest sur 

 plus of permanent pleasure. And if so, this 

 would be a reason for a non-moral being sup 

 pressing it. But Darwin makes no such supposi 

 tion ; nor would it in the least serve his purpose. 

 For his problem is to generate conscience, and he 

 rightly saw that, though a non-moral being who 

 preferred a momentary to a permanent pleasure 

 might, on reflection, deem himself short-sighted, 

 imprudent, or even foolish, such a being could have 

 no experience of that heart-breaking emotion of 

 remorse which Darwin identifies with conscience. 



Darwin makes remorse the concomitant of the 

 recollection of suppressed social instincts ; yet in 

 the results, actual or possible, entailed by the 

 suppression we find no ground for remorse, while 

 as regards the act of suppression, due as it was 



