Darwin s Ethical Theory. 197 



to the pleasure-giving triumph of a selfish in 

 stinct, we have seen that a non-moral being, re 

 flecting upon it, could have no other feeling than 

 self-complacency. But (it will be objected) the 

 non-moral being who formerly gave way to sel 

 fishness is supposed by Darwin to be, at the 

 moment of reflection, under the influence of the 

 ever present and persistent social instincts and 

 sympathies ; and it is in their reinstalled light 

 that the former outburst of egoism now appears 

 shameful and fills the reflecting agent with re 

 morse. This supposition, which is manifestly 

 borrowed from the experiences of a moral being, 

 presupposes one of two conditions, either of 

 which is absolutely destructive to the ethical hy 

 pothesis of Darwin. If reflection upon violated . \ 

 social instincts could engender such sentiments in 

 a non-moral intelligence, either the reflection 1 !^. 

 very inadequate or a worth is attributed to the 

 social sentiments hitherto denied them by the 

 theory. Suppose the reflection thorough and 

 complete, then what avail the solicitations of 

 present sociability to color and distort the images 

 reflection evokes ? A developed intellect wilft 

 not confound the present with the past, or fool-1 

 ishly dream that, because at this moment a tri 

 umph of the social instincts would be pleasur- 



