The Evolution of Morality. 205 



that moral laws were but the empirically estab 

 lished prescripts for securing the largest quantum 

 of pleasure to the greatest number of individuals. 

 It may indeed be questioned whether historical 

 ethics ever really touches, much less confirms, the 

 point which either of these parties has most at 

 heart. If the main issue between them turns 

 upon the question of the chief end of life, the 

 summum ~bonum, then whether it is pleasure, as 

 the hedonist assumes, or goodness, as the intu- 

 itionist assumes, cannot, I apprehend, be deter 

 mined by a study of the morals of savages and 

 barbarians any more than by a study of the 

 morals of Christians. And if the issue turns 

 rather on the absoluteness or relativity of the 

 moral law, then if by &quot; absolute &quot; is meant valid 

 for all spirits, human and divine, and if by &quot; rel 

 ative&quot; is meant dependent upon circumstances, 

 I do not see how comparative morals, in this 

 case either, can decide the controversy. But if, 

 dropping these speculative puzzles, we shift our 

 position altogether and raise the simple induc 

 tive inquiry, What acts have men everywhere 

 and at all times considered right or wrong re 

 spectively, and what acts have some considered 

 right or indifferent and others wrong ? tables of 

 agreement and difference can be drawn up to 



