The Evolution of Morality. 253 



are intuitive, self-evident, and underived. And, 

 as a matter of fact, the principle of universal 

 benevolence has been so treated by relativists, at 

 least since the time of Bentham. But the impli 

 cations of their logic have been hidden from 

 themselves, through emphasis upon irrelevant 

 issues. Holding the happiness of mankind as 

 the sole ultimate good, they delighted to dwell 

 upon the relativity of sundry virtues, and to 

 show their emptiness and worthlessness apart 

 from a tendency to promote the general welfare. 

 And with still more ardor they proclaimed that 

 the supreme good, or happiness of mankind, con 

 sisted in pleasure, which alone they declared 

 truly desirable, if, indeed (as they generally de 

 nied), anything else could really be the object of 

 human desire. Now, these highly speculative 

 and dubious positions should not obscure to our 

 view the underlying intuitional groundwork. 

 Something at least is recognized as self-evident, 

 primitive, and inviolably obligatory the welfare 

 of mankind. It is not, therefore, upon the ex 

 istence of primitive intuitions, but upon their 

 number, that the difference turns between the 

 relative and the absolute moralist. They agree 

 that there are primal and underived moral prin 

 ciples; but they cannot agree in determining 



