The Evolution of Morality. 255 



moral law, the comparative primitiveness of moral 

 principles, the derivative or inderivative character 

 of morality. And after the methodological con 

 siderations in the first chapter, it will scarcely be 

 necessary to remark that, in my opinion, the ques 

 tion can be settled only by an appeal to observa 

 tion and history. 



It may be objected that ethics deals with what 

 ought to be, not what has been. But the objection 

 ignores the fatal consideration that NO SCIENCE CAN 



DETERMINE WHAT OUGHT TO BE ; that W6 kllOW it, 



as a mathematical friend of mine is wont to say, 

 in language as aptly expressive as Wordsworth s 

 ode, only by &quot;feeling it in our bones ; &quot; and that 

 any speculation on the subject has no authority 

 or validity beyond the speculator himself. Be 

 sides, the problem of the science of ethics, or of 

 historical ethics, is not adequately described in 

 the foregoing objection. That problem is, if not 

 what ought to be, at least what ?nan has thought 

 ought to l)e. 



Unfortunately, data are not yet at hand for the 

 complete solution of this scientific problem. The 

 science of historical ethics is still too young to 

 have established what moral principles are ulti 

 mate and fundamental that is, what principles 

 man, everywhere and at all times, has considered 



