SECT. 21.] Measurement of Belief. 143 



question now under examination. The more closely we have 

 analysed special examples, the more unmistakeably are we 

 brought to the conclusion that in the individual instance no 

 justification of anything like quantitative belief is to be 

 found ; at least none is to be found in the same sense in 

 which we expect it in ordinary scientific conclusions, whether 

 Inductive or Deductive. And yet we have to face and 

 account for the fact that common impressions, as attested by 

 a whole vocabulary of common phrases, are in favour of the 

 existence of this quantitative belief. How are we to account 

 for this ? If we appeal to an example again, and analyse it 

 somewhat more closely, we may yet find our way to some 

 satisfactory explanation. 



In our previous analysis ( 18) we found it sufficient to stop 

 at an early stage, and to give as the justification of our belief 

 the fact of the proposition being true. Stopping however at 

 that stage, we have found this explanation fail altogether to 

 give a justification of partial belief; fail, that is, when applied 

 to the individual instance. The two states of belief and dis 

 belief correspond admirably to the two results of the event 

 happening and not happening respectively, and unless for 

 psychological purposes we saw no reason to analyse further ; 

 but to partial belief there is nothing corresponding in the re 

 sult, for the event cannot partially happen in such cases as we 

 are concerned with. Suppose then we advance a step further 

 in the analysis, and ask again what is meant by the proposi 

 tion being true ? This introduces us, of course, to a very long 

 and intricate path ; but in the short distance along it which 

 we shall advance, we shall not, it is to be hoped, find any 

 very serious difficulty. As before, we will illustrate the 

 analysis by first applying it to the case of ordinary full belief. 



22. Whatever opinion then may be held about the 

 essential nature of belief, it will probably be admitted that a 



