158 Measurement of Belief. [CHAP. VI. 



templation of unexpected events. Hence our surprise, though, 

 as stated above, having no proper claim to admission into 

 the science of Probability, is such a constant and regular 

 accompaniment of that which Probability is concerned with, 

 that notice must often be taken of it. References will oc 

 casionally be found to this aspect of the question in the 

 following chapters. 



It may be remarked in passing, for the sake of further 

 illustration of the subject, that this emotional accompani 

 ment of surprise, to which we are thus able to assign some 

 thing like a fractional value, differs in two important respects 

 from the commonly accepted fraction of belief. In the first 

 place, it has what may be termed an independent existence ; 

 it is intelligible by itself. The belief, as we endeavoured to 

 show, needs explanation and finds it in our consequent con 

 duct. Not so with the emotion; this stands upon its own 

 footing, and may be examined in and by itself. Hence, in 

 the second place, it is as applicable, and as capable of any kind 

 of justification, in relation to the single event, as to a series of 

 events. In this respect, as will be remembered, it offers a 

 complete contrast to our state of belief about any one con 

 tingent event. May not these considerations help to account 

 for the general acceptance of the doctrine, that we have a 

 certain definite and measurable amount of belief about these 

 events ? I cannot help thinking that what is so obviously 

 true of the emotional portion of the belief, has been uncon 

 sciously transferred to the other or intellectual portion of the 

 compound condition, to which it is not applicable, and where 

 it cannot find a justification. 



33. A further illustration may now be given of the 

 subjective view of Probability at present under discus 

 sion. 



An appeal to common language is always of service, as 



