SECT. 2.] The Rule of Succession. 191 



who has treated of either subject ; I have not however seen 

 any account of this connection that seemed to me to be 

 satisfactory. An explicit description of it should rather be 

 sought in treatises upon the narrower subject, Probability ; 

 but it is precisely here that the most confusion is to be 

 found. The province of Probability being somewhat narrow, 

 incursions have been constantly made from it into the ad 

 jacent territory of Induction. In this way, amongst the 

 arithmetical rules discussed in the last chapter, others have 

 been frequently introduced which ought not in strictness to 

 be classed with them, as they rest on an entirely different 

 basis. 



2. The origin of such confusion is easy of explana 

 tion; it arises, doubtless, from the habit of laying undue 

 stress upon the subjective side of Probability, upon that 

 which treats of the quantity of our belief upon different 

 subjects and the variations of which that quantity is sus 

 ceptible. It has been already urged that this variation of 

 belief is at most but a constant accompaniment of what is 

 really essential to Probability, and is moreover common to 

 other subjects as well. By denning the science therefore 

 from this side these other subjects would claim admittance 

 into it ; some of these, as Induction, have been accepted, but 

 others have been somewhat arbitrarily rejected. Our belief 

 in a wider proposition gained by Induction is, prior to verifi 

 cation, not so strong as that of the narrower generalization 

 from which it is inferred. This being observed, a so-called 

 rule of probability has been given by which it is supposed 

 that this diminution of assent could in many instances be 

 calculated. 



But time also works changes in our conviction ; our belief 

 in the happening of almost every event, if we recur to it long 

 afterwards, when the evidence has faded from the mind is 



