200 The Rule of Succession. [CHAP. vm. 



Now this case furnishes a very close parallel to our 

 supposed attempt to measure the increase of intensity of 

 belief after repeated recurrence. That is, if it were possible 

 to experiment in this order of mental phenomena, we ought 

 simply to repeat a phenomenon a certain number of times 

 and then ascertain by actual introspection or by some simple 

 test, how fast the belief was increasing. Thus viewed the 

 problem seems to me a hopeless one. The difficulties are 

 serious enough, when we are trying to measure our simple 

 sensations, of laying aside the effects of past training, and of 

 attempting, as it were, to leave the mind open and passive 

 to mere reception of stimuli. But if we were to attempt 

 in this way to measure our belief these difficulties would 

 become quite insuperable. We can no more divest our 

 selves of past training here than we can of intelligence or 

 thought. I do not see how any one could possibly avoid 

 classing the observed recurrences with others which he had 

 experienced, and of being thus guided by special analogies 

 and inductions instead of trusting solely to De Morgan s 

 pure induction . The same considerations tend to rebut 

 another form of defence for the rule in question. It is 

 urged, for instance, that we may at least resort to it in 

 those cases in which we are in entire ignorance as to the 

 number and nature of the antecedents. This is a position to 

 which I can hardly conceive it possible that we should ever 

 be reduced. However remote or exceptional may be the 

 phenomenon selected we may yet bring it into relation with 

 some accepted generalizations and thus draw our conclusions 

 from these rather than from purely a priori considera 

 tions. 



10. Since then past acquisitions cannot be laid aside 

 or allowed for, the only remaining resource would be to 

 experiment upon the infant mind. One would not like 



