CHAPTER IX. 



INDUCTION AND ITS CONNECTION WITH PROBABILITY. 



1. WE were occupied, during the last chapter, with the 

 examination of a rule, the object of which was to enable 

 us to make inferences about instances as yet unexamined. 

 It was professedly, therefore, a rule of an inductive cha 

 racter. But, in the form in which it is commonly expressed, 

 it was found to fail utterly. It is reasonable therefore to 

 enquire at this point whether Probability is entirely a formal 

 or deductive science, or whether, on the other hand, we are 

 able, by means of it, to make valid inferences about instances 

 as yet unexamined. This question has been already in part 

 answered by implication in the course of the last two chap 

 ters. It is proposed in the present chapter to devote a fuller 

 investigation to this subject, and to describe, as minutely as 

 limits will allow, the nature of the connection between Pro 

 bability and Induction. We shall find it advisable for clear 

 ness of conception to commence our enquiry at a somewhat 

 early stage. We will travel over the ground, however, as 

 rapidly as possible, until we approach the boundary of what 

 can properly be termed Probability. 



2. Let us then conceive some one setting to work to 

 investigate nature, under its broadest aspect, with the view 

 of systematizing the facts of experience that are known, and 

 thence (in case he should find that this is possible) discover- 



