SECT. 7.] Induction. 209 



view has of course been entertained. They are mostly dis 

 posed to distinguish these sciences very sharply from, not to 

 say to contrast them with, one another; the one being 

 accepted as philosophical or logical, and the other rejected 

 as mathematical. This may without offence be termed the 

 popular prejudice against Probability. 



A somewhat different view, however, must be noticed 

 here, which, by a sort of reaction against the latter, seems 

 even to go beyond the former ; and which occasionally finds 

 expression in the statement that all inductive reasoning of 

 every kind is merely a matter of Probability. Two examples 

 of this may be given. 



Beginning with the older authority, there is an often 

 quoted saying by Butler at the commencement of his Ana 

 logy, that probability is the very guide of life ; a saying 

 which seems frequently to be understood to signify that the 

 rules or principles of Probability are thus all-prevalent when 

 we are drawing conclusions in practical life. Judging by 

 the drift of the context, indeed, this seems a fair inter 

 pretation of his meaning, in so far of course as there could 

 be said to be any such thing as a science of Probability in 

 those days. Prof. Jevons, in his Principles of Science 

 (p. 197), has expressed a somewhat similar view, of course 

 in a way more consistent with the principles of modern 

 science, physical and mathematical. He says, &quot;I am con 

 vinced that it is impossible to expound the methods of in 

 duction in a sound manner, without resting them on the 

 theory of Probability. Perfect knowledge alone can give 

 certainty, and in nature perfect knowledge would be infinite 

 knowledge, which is clearly beyond our capacities. We have, 

 therefore, to content ourselves with partial knowledge, 

 knowledge mingled with ignorance, producing doubt 1 .&quot; 



1 See also Dugald Stewart (Ed. by Hamilton; vn. pp. 115119). 



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