210 Induction. [CHAP. IX. 



8. There are two senses in which this disposition to 

 merge the two sciences into one may be understood. Using 

 the word Probability in its vague popular signification, 

 nothing more may be intended than to call attention to the 

 fact, that in every case alike our conclusions are nothing 

 more than probable, that is, that they are not, and cannot 

 be, absolutely certain. This must be fully admitted, for of 

 course no one acquainted with the complexity of physical 

 and other evidence would seriously maintain that absolute 

 ideal certainty can be attained in any branch of applied 

 logic. Hypothetical certainty, in abstract science, may be 

 possible, but not absolute certainty in the domain of the 

 concrete. This has been already noticed in a former chapter, 

 where, however, it was pointed out that whatever justifica 

 tion may exist, on the subjective view of logic, for regarding 

 this common prevalence of absence of certainty as warranting 

 us in fusing the sciences into one, no such justification is 

 admitted when we take the objective view. 



9. What may be meant, however, is that the grounds 

 of this absence of certainty are always of the same general 

 character. This argument, if admitted, would have real 

 force, and must therefore be briefly noticed. We have seen 

 abundantly that when we say of a conclusion within the 

 strict province of Probability, that it is not certain, all that 

 we mean is that in some proportion of cases only will such 

 conclusion be right, in the other cases it will be wrong. 

 Now when we say, in reference to any inductive conclusion, 

 that we feel uncertain about its absolute cogency, are we 

 conscious of the same interpretation ? It seems to me that 

 we are not. It is indeed quite possible that on ultimate 

 analysis it might be proved that experience of failure in 

 the past employment of our methods of investigation was 

 the main cause of our present want of perfect confidence in 



