SECT. 10.] Induction. 211 



them. But this, as we have repeatedly insisted, does not 

 belong to the province of logical, but to that of Psycholo 

 gical enquiry. It is surely not the case that we are, as a rule, 

 consciously guided by such occasional or repeated instances 

 of past failure. In so far as they are at all influential, they 

 seem to do their work by infusing a vague want &quot;of confi 

 dence which cannot be referred to any statistical grounds for 

 its justification, at least not in a quantitative way. Part of 

 our want of confidence is derived sympathetically from those 

 who have investigated the matter more nearly at first hand. 

 Here again, analysis might detect that a given proportion of 

 past failures lay at the root of the distrust, but it does not 

 show at the surface. Moreover, one reason why we cannot 

 feel perfectly certain about our inductions is, that the 

 memory has to be appealed to for some of our data ; and will 

 any one assert that the only reason why we do not place 

 absolute reliance on our memory of events long past is that 

 we have been deceived in that way before ? 



In any other sense, therefore, than as a needful protest 

 against attaching too great demonstrative force to the con 

 clusions of Inductive Logic, it seems decidedly misleading to 

 speak of its reasonings as resting upon Probability. 



10. We may now see clearly the reasons for the 

 limits within which causation 1 is necessarily required, but 

 beyond which it is not needed. To be able to generalize 

 a formula so as to extend it from the observed to the unob 

 served, it is clearly essential that there should be a certain 

 permanence in the order of nature ; this permanence is one 

 form of what is implied in the term causation. If the 



1 Eequired that is for purposes of versal prevalence, or its all-import- 

 logical inference within the limits of ance for scientific purposes. The 

 Probability; it is not intended to im- subject is more fully discussed in a 

 ply any doubts as to its actual uni- future chapter. 



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